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Abstract 
The performance of many of the technologies 
used in physical protection systems that guard high-
value assets are heavily influenced by weather and 
visibility conditions as well as intruder capabilities. 
This complicates the already difficult problem of 
optimizing the design of multi-layered physical 
protection systems. This paper develops an 
optimization model for the automatic design of these 
systems with explicit consideration of the impact of 
weather and visibility conditions as well as intruder 
capabilities on system performance. An illustrative 
case study is provided. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The automatic design of a multi-layered physical 
protection system (PPS), such as those guarding 
high-value assets, requires the efficient creation and 
evaluation of various security architectures without 
performing an exhaustive enumeration of all possible 
options. The efficacy of a design should not only 
consider the delay and detection characteristics, but 
must also consider the impact that system 
nuisance/false alarm rates have on the alarm station 
operators. Additionally, the architecture must be 
resilient to a variety of environmental conditions and 
intruder types which impact sensor and barrier 
performance. The naïve approach of using the 
average-case representation of the PPS performance 
characteristics tends to generate an architecture that is 
highly vulnerable to the worst case scenario and is 
shown to be inferior to the stochastic optimization 
approach presented in this paper.  
An established approach to evaluating a PPS is to 
use adversary sequence diagrams (ASDs) to describe 
the layers of protection that the attacker must pass 
through in order to reach a target [6]. An ASD 
typically includes defining detection and delay values 
for each element along a path to the target. It often 
represents adjacent areas in diagrams using 
concentric rectangles. We utilize a layered approach 
as well, but one that is two-dimensional and focused 
on the actual physical system layout. For example, 
impassable obstacles or buildings are represented as 
voids on the system grid. [3] describes the integration 
of a human-generated PPS design modeled in 3-D 
with 2-D design evaluation models. [8] and [11] 
describe a simulation for design of PPSs integrating 
Systematic Analysis of Vulnerability to Intrusion 
(SAVI) [10] for most vulnerable path (MVP) 
selection. Our approach uses a 2-D projection of a 3-
D facility model with automated path identification, 
architecture generation and evaluation based on 
allowable design alternatives, intruder capabilities, 
and environmental factors. As such, our approach 
reduces PPS design time when compared to [3], [8], 
[10] and [11] by combining standard MVP design 
factors to automatically generate architectures, and 
improves resilience to multiple environmental 
scenarios. It also creates architectures that trade off 
performance against investment cost so that decision 
makers can select the most effective PPS within a 
fixed budget.  
[5] develops an optimization model to select 
mitigation measures for physical security using 
historical data on the effectiveness of specific 
mitigation measures and a multiplicative model to 
integrate these effects together. In contrast, we 
employ a game theoretic approach to model the 
decision-making of the intruder, thereby computing 
more directly the impacts of security measures. [12] 
uses Dempster-Shafer evidence theory to develop a 
risk map of a given architecture and then optimizes 
that risk map via sensor placement based on a 
modified averaging approach for belief functions. [7] 
develops a shortest path algorithm to determine the 
MVP in a security system. We adopt this 
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computation with some modifications to the 
implementation described in [4]. 
 
2. Model formulation 
 
The model developed in this paper extends the 
model given in [4] in two significant dimensions. 
First, scenarios are used to describe the connection 
between weather, visibility conditions and intruder 
capabilities with detection probability. Second, the 
probability of interruption given detection (PI) is now 
computed including the impact of nuisance and false 
alarm rates (NAR/FAR) on operator performance as 
described in [1]. These modifications yield a more 
realistic and comprehensive optimization model 
compared to previous work by treating the alarm 
station operator (ASO) as an integral part of the PPS 
and the various environmental scenarios as design 
considerations.  
Suppose there is a network that connects a 
location with a target. Each link in the network (i,j) 
represents places in which security technology may 
be located as well as links in the path that the intruder 
may take. For simplicity we refer to a feasible 
collection of security technologies for a particular 
link (i,j) as a package. Hence, let 𝐼𝑖𝑗
𝑦
 be a binary 
variable that takes on a value of 1 if investment 
package y is placed on arc (i,j) and 0 otherwise. 
Feasible collections of technologies that can be 
placed on an arc must be used instead of directly 
representing the individual technologies, because the 
combined effects are not generally the same as the 
sum of the effects of the individual technologies. For 
example, the probability of detection, (PD), on an arc 
when two different technologies are employed is not 
the sum of the two probabilities. 𝑐𝑖𝑗
𝑦
 is the cost of 
investment package y on link (i,j) and 𝐴𝑖𝑗
𝑠𝑦
 is the 
NAR/FAR for investment package y on link (i,j) 
under scenario s. Further, r is an index for the paths 
that connect the intruder origin with the target of 
interest. Let 𝑧𝑟𝑠 be a binary variable that takes on a 
value of 1 if path r is taken under scenario s. Finally, 
let 𝑔𝑟𝑠 be the PI for path r under scenario s. 
 
𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝐼𝑖𝑗
𝑦  [
𝑚𝑖𝑛
𝑧𝑟𝑠
 ∑ 𝑔𝑟𝑠𝑧𝑟𝑠
𝑟
] 
 
𝑚𝑖𝑛
𝐼𝑖𝑗
𝑦 [∑ ∑ 𝐴𝑖𝑗
𝑠𝑦𝐼𝑖𝑗
𝑦
𝑦𝑖𝑗 ]   (1)   
 
𝑚𝑖𝑛
𝐼𝑖𝑗
𝑦 [∑ ∑ 𝑐𝑖𝑗
𝑦 𝐼𝑖𝑗
𝑦
𝑦𝑖𝑗 ]       
 
Such that  
 ∑ 𝑧𝑟𝑠𝑟 = 1  ∀𝑠  (2) 
 𝑧𝑟𝑠 ∈ {0,1} ∀𝑟, 𝑠  (3) 
𝐼𝑖𝑗
𝑦 ∈ {0,1} ∀(𝑖, 𝑗), 𝑦  (4) 
 
Equation (1) describes the three objectives of the 
system owner. The first objective maximizes the PI 
the intruder faces. The inner objective expresses the 
desire of the intruder to minimize their probability of 
interruption given detection, PI, by finding the most 
vulnerable path. Notice that this is done assuming 
that an architecture is in place and searching over all 
paths and all scenarios. The outer objective 
represents the system owner, who is searching over 
all possible architectures via the decision variables 
𝐼𝑖𝑗
𝑦 , to identify the architecture that maximizes the PI.  
It is important to realize that the PI for a given 
architecture is scenario-dependent because the PD for 
a sensor is dependent on the environmental 
conditions. Hence for a given architecture, we use the 
lowest PI across all environmental conditions (i.e., all 
scenarios). This is a conservative assumption because 
it assumes that the intruder has sufficient knowledge 
to identify the environmental conditions that will 
maximize their chance of success. 
The second objective minimizes the NAR/FAR. 
The third objective minimizes system costs. These 
three terms identify a three-dimensional design space 
from which the optimal architecture is selected. 
Equation (2) requires that the intruder select a single 
path under each scenario. Equations (3) and (4) give 
the binary restrictions on the decision variables.  
Many investments are only effective if they are 
deployed as a cycle or a contiguous boundary instead 
of possibly disconnected, single-link investments as 
described in [4]. Consequently, we make use of 
“layered” investments where a single investment 
layer consists of a collection of link investments of a 
single type (e.g., sensor “sX” investments) forming a 
contiguous boundary around the target at a fixed 
radius. This strategy decreases the computational 
complexity by several orders of magnitude while still 
maintaining high quality solutions.  
All link travel times and the Response Force 
Time (RFT) are treated as Gaussian random variables 
with a standard deviation of 10% of the mean. 
Additionally, we treat the ASO processing time 
(assessment plus queue waiting time), which has a 
calculated mean value as described in [1], as a 
Gaussian random variable with a 10% standard 
deviation. The resultant probability that the RFT 
(augmented by the ASO processing time) is less than 
the intruder travel time to the target (after detection) 
is given by equation (5). 
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𝑃(𝑇𝑅+𝐴𝑆 < 𝑇𝐴𝑇) = 𝑃(𝑇𝑖) = 𝜑 [
∑ 𝜇𝑗−(𝜇𝑅+𝜇𝐴𝑆)𝑗≥𝑖
∑ 𝜎𝑗
2+(𝜎𝑅
2+𝜎𝐴𝑆
2 )𝑗≥𝑖
] 
  (5) 
 
Where the subscript R is used for the RFT, AS for 
the ASO processing time, AT for the attacker travel 
time post detection, i for the index of the link where 
initial detection occurred, and j for the link index 
across all indices after detection. The overall PI based 
on the PD on link i, Di, can then be written as 
equation (6). 
𝑃(𝐼) = 𝐷1𝑃(𝑇1) + ∑ 𝐷𝑖𝑃(𝑇𝑖) ∏ (1 − 𝐷𝑗)
𝑖−1
𝑗=1
𝑛
𝑖=2  (6) 
 
These equations are extensions of the ones 
defined in [9], which are based on seminal work on PI 
in [2], also described in [6]. Since this probability 
becomes vanishingly small when the initial detection 
is close to the target, we set a threshold to ignore low 
probability paths (PI = 0.1) which mitigates the 
multipath issue described in [4] when trying to find 
the MVP (the path with the lowest PI). 
 
3. Solution procedure 
 
The solution procedure for generating the 
candidate security architectures uses an investment 
planning optimization, similar to the one presented in 
[4]. A genetic algorithm (GA) determines the best 
mix of investments to apply to the network based on 
an objective composed of investment cost, 
NAR/FAR, and PI. To provide a more realistic RFT, 
we include an assessment time based on system 
NAR/FAR using the ASO model described in [1].  
Since the investments are now collected in 
synergistic layers, there is no need to use the region 
crossover method for genetic crossover as done 
previously in [4], hence a traditional random cut 
procedure is used. Each child produced is post-
processed to guarantee feasibility by ensuring that at 
least one layer of each investment type (delay, 
detection, and ASO) is included, since anything less 
creates an infeasible solution. If no ASO investments 
are initially selected, then the minimum number 
required to keep the NAR/FAR per operator within 
the “low” range of alarms per day (as defined in [1]) 
is added. If multiple ASO layers are selected, then the 
layer with the least number of operators that can 
feasibly process all alarms is kept, with all others 
removed. 
The initial population is created using a two-stage 
greedy algorithm, where the first stage creates the 
minimum required delay strategy, and the second 
stage adds the detection layers required to give a PI 
above a minimum threshold.  
The delay stage uses a modified objective that 
trades off time delay versus investment cost. The 
minimum path delay must exceed the RFT plus the 
minimum ASO assessment time with a probability 
greater than 0.95. The delay investment layers are 
sorted by incremental benefit (ratio of added delay to 
investment cost) and applied until the minimum 
probability is met or exceeded. The detection stage 
uses a trade-off between investment costs, 
NAR/FAR, and PI. The detection layers are initially 
sorted by decreasing PD, increasing distance from 
target, increasing NAR/FAR, and increasing cost (in 
that order). The sorted collection of investments is 
applied to the network until PI is greater than a small 
threshold (0.1). The minimum number of ASOs 
required to accommodate the investment NAR/FAR 
is determined concurrently and is applied as part of 
the initial investment strategy. At this point, the 
remaining unused layers (both delay and detection) 
are sorted by incremental benefit (ratio of increase in 
PI to investment cost) and applied until the minimum 
PI is met or exceeded. Note that the minimum PI is 
generally quite large (on the order of 99%) and the 
trade-off cost for each detection investment includes 
the cost of any additional ASOs above those required 
for the initial investment strategy. 
The initial population consists of the greedy 
investment strategy, as well as a significant number 
of random strategies (on the order of 1,000). This 
initial population is used to form the initial efficient 
frontier, which is then augmented by cleaning and 
decimating the efficient frontier and top 5% of 
solutions closest to the efficient frontier. The 
cleaning process randomly removes as many 
investment layers as possible without significantly 
decreasing PI for each solution examined. The 
decimation process examines each of the cleaned 
solutions and randomly removes single investment 
layers, adding each modified solution to the 
population of solutions (and the efficient frontier, if 
appropriate) as long as the newly created solution has 
a PI above a given threshold (in all experiments in 
this paper we use 50%). 
 
4. Case study  
 
The illustrative case study is an 11x11 grid with 
the target in the center. This yields 121 nodes and 
420 arcs in the resultant network. Each scenario is 
based on the intruder’s ability to degrade different 
investments combined with the environmental 
conditions. We assume that the probability of 
detection for each sensor, PD, is impacted differently 
by the environmental conditions. Table 1 gives the 
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environmental conditions and their probability of 
occurrence. 
 
Table 1. Notional environmental scenarios 
 
Environmental 
Conditions 
Abbreviation Probability 
of 
Occurrence 
Daytime No 
Precipitation 
DNP 0.5 
Daytime With 
Precipitation 
DWP 0.1 
Nighttime No 
Precipitation 
NNP 0.3 
Nighttime With 
Precipitation 
NWP 0.1 
 
For the purpose of this example, each scenario 
has two elements: one of the four environmental 
conditions given in Table 1 and the capability of the 
intruder. The capabilities of the intruder influence PD 
for each sensor (sX, sY, and sZ) as well as the time it 
takes for the intruder to overcome each fence (F). 
Table 2 gives notional values (PD for sensors and 
delay time in seconds for fences) based on the 
environmental conditions specified in Table 1.  
  
Table 2. Notional intruder sensor/barrier 
degrade capabilities under different 
environmental conditions 
 
 DNP DWP 
Tech. N D N D 
sX 0.80 0.70 0.70 0.60 
sY 0.85 0.75 0.82 0.75 
sZ 0.60 0.55 0.95 0.8 
F 60 30 70 40 
 
 NNP NWP 
Tech. N D N D 
sX 0.4 0.30 0.35 0. 30 
sY 0.45 0.30 0.50 0.47 
sZ 0.53 0.47 0.85 0.75 
F 70 40 80 60 
N, D: Normal & Degraded 
 
Table 3 gives the cost, NAR/FAR, and average 
and worst case detection probabilities for each 
technology. The last row gives the cost for an ASO.  
 
Table 3: Notional investment cost, NAR/FAR 
and average/worst case performance 
 
Tech. 10-year 
Cost 
($1000s) 
NAR 
/FAR 
Average Worst 
Case 
sX $100 3 0.58 0.3 
sY $200 6 0.64 0.3 
sZ $300 12 0.61 0.47 
F $3 0 51.5 30 
ASO $10,000 N/A N/A N/A 
 
5. Results 
 
Figure 1 shows the estimated efficient frontier 
where the three objectives pursued are the worst case 
PI (across weather and visibility conditions and 
attacker types), NAR/FAR (given by the labels) and 
cost. Only points that had a worst case PI that exceeds 
90% are shown. The architectures range from $120 
million to almost $194 million. The $194 million 
architecture has a worst case PI = 96.5%. 
Figure 2 gives a graph of the average PI across all 
scenarios in comparison to the worst case. To create 
an average value, each intruder type is assumed to be 
equally likely. This assumption does not impact the 
optimization because it optimizes across all eight 
scenarios (four weather and two types of intruders) 
and focuses on the PI from the scenario that produces 
the highest vulnerability. The average difference is 
on the order of 5%. However, the largest difference is 
about 7.5%. The average performance for the 
architecture that costs about $194 million with a 
worst case PI = 96.5% has an average PI = 99.3%. 
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Figure 1. Estimated efficient frontier 
(solutions with worse case performance that 
exceeds 90% PI) 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Average PI vs. worst case for 
solutions on the frontier given in Figure 1 
 
The best performing (highest PI on average and 
worst case) efficient solutions tend to have several 
key physical characteristics, as illustrated by the PPS 
architecture in Figure 3. First, fences are built in the 
investment layers closest to the target, underscoring 
the desire to slow an intruder down after detection, 
giving the ASOs and response force sufficient time to 
respond. Second, a diverse collection of sensors is 
placed towards the outer perimeter of the grid. The 
diversity ensures that the architecture is effective 
against all scenarios, as different sensor types are 
better suited for different environmental conditions. 
The sensors are most beneficial farther away from the 
target, since early detection gives the ASOs and 
response force more time to respond. This sensor 
placement strategy results in a high NAR/FAR, 
necessitating the employment of a large number of 
ASOs. This solution suggests 5 ASOs to combat the 
almost 1,300 NAR/FAR. 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Illustrative solution on efficient 
frontier (Worst-Case PI = 0.9647, Average PI = 
0.993, 5 ASO) 
 
High-performing solutions like those in Figure 3 
are also extremely costly. In order to reduce the cost 
of a solution without drastically reducing 
performance, a typical strategy is to remove sensors 
from the outermost investment layers, where many 
sensors are needed per layer. This also reduces 
NAR/FAR, which means that fewer ASOs are 
required.  
Figure 4 (10-year cost of $119.8M) illustrates a 
much cheaper but less effective alternative to the 
solution in Figure 3 (10-year cost of $193.8M), with 
the expensive but high-performing sY and sZ sensors 
removed from the outer layer. These two solutions 
represent the extremes of the efficient frontier 
pictured in Figure 1.  
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As an alternative to the stochastic program, a 
single scenario could be used with average values for 
the sensor detection probabilities and the fence delay 
times based on the likelihood of each of the weather 
conditions and the two types of intruders. A 
comparison of the value of the solutions identified 
via this average scenario and those given in Figure 1 
provides insight into the value of the stochastic 
program. To perform this computation, we now use 
the probability of each scenario explicitly in the 
optimization. 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Illustrative solution on efficient 
frontier (Worst-Case PI = 0.9016, Average PI 
= 0.9761, 3 ASO) 
 
Figure 5 gives a comparison of the efficient 
solutions based on an average scenario (circles) and 
the solutions given in Figure 1 (squares). The 
diagonal line in Figure 5 indicates solutions for 
which the worst case PI is the same as the average 
(hence there is no variability in the PI across 
scenarios). Solutions that are close to this line have 
less variability in the PI across scenarios. 
The labels are the PI reported by the optimization 
for the estimate of the efficient frontier using a single 
average scenario. Notice that the true mean PI across 
all scenarios is generally lower than what the 
optimization suggests is the PI (using only the single 
average scenario). The average difference between 
the true average and what the optimization reports is 
the PI is about 9%. Second, there are some solutions 
for which the optimization reports that the PI is 
greater than 90% but the true average across all the 
scenarios for this architecture is less than 90%. The 
point labeled with an arrow is just such a situation. 
The PI of the average scenario is 93.7%; however, the 
true average is 79%, and the worst case is 62%. 
Finally, the worst case is generally substantially 
worse than the true average. The average difference 
between the true average and the worst case is about 
19%, but that difference reaches about 42% in one of 
the scenarios.  
In contrast, the solutions from Figure 1 (indicated 
by the squares) have an average performance that is 
within about 5% of the worst case. The objective 
does not reward solutions for which the performance 
is particularly good on some scenarios. Rather, it 
focuses the trade-off analysis on maximizing PI for 
the worst-case scenario (the scenario to which the 
system is most vulnerable). If we are to assume that 
the intruder is knowledgeable, this is advantageous. 
 
 
 
Figure 5. Comparison of the efficient 
solutions based on an average scenario and 
the solutions given in Figure 1 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
In order to design a PPS that is resilient to a 
variety of weather scenarios and intruders with 
enhanced capabilities, it is critical that a scenario-
based optimization approach be employed. As 
demonstrated by our analysis, trying to create a 
system that performs well against a spectrum of 
factors by using an average-case representation of the 
PPS performance characteristics tends to generate an 
architecture that is highly vulnerable to the worst 
case scenario.  
Additional research is valuable in at least the 
following three areas. First, this model assumed a 
single attacker identifying the weakest path during 
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the most vulnerable weather and visibility conditions. 
In practice there may be locations which, if attacked, 
render other defenses less potent, such as a control 
center for video surveillance feed, for example. This 
opens up the possibility that teams of attackers 
working collectively with different goals may be able 
to create more potent attacks. Second, this model 
assumed that the ASOs process alarms in the order 
received and that there is no priority among the 
alarms. In practice, some alarms are more reliable 
than others and some are more important due to their 
location in the PPS. Integrating priority queuing ideas 
into the modeling is valuable. Finally, this analysis 
assumed that each sensor had a fixed NAR/FAR. For 
many sensors, it is likely that the weather conditions 
and visibility impact the NAR/FAR. This is easy to 
incorporate but is also very likely to suggest that 
ASO staffing could fluctuate based on the 
environmental conditions. 
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